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Augmenting the Limitations of Organizational Compassion with Wisdom and 
Power: Insights from Bhutan 
Abstract: Compassionate organizational practices emphasizing human dignity and wellbeing within 
the workplace have been identified as underpinning a great number of organizational benefits. These 
include enhanced employee engagement, commitment, loyalty, trust and productivity, along with 
reduced absenteeism and turnover. Drawing upon insights on administrative compassion in Bhutan, I 
suggest that it is a folly to single out compassion on its own as the source of positive organizational 
outcomes. I argue that additional qualities of phronesis or wisdom and understanding of the workings 
of power are equally crucial. Indeed, without these additional attributes, compassion can be 
sentimental and misguided, indicating a lack of judgment that increases suffering. 
Keywords: organizational compassion, positive organizational scholarship, power 
PAPER TEXT – At the turn of the millennium compassion emerged as the focus of serious academic 
theorizing in organizational studies under the banner of Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS) 
(Frost, 1999; Frost, Dutton, Worline, & Wilson, 2000). An organizational counterpart to positive 
psychology, POS is concerned with positive characteristics that help realize human potential within 
the context of management and organizational studies (Berstein, 2003; Caza & Caza, 2008).  
The benefits of organizational compassion identified by research include boosting organizational 
trust, pride, connection, motivation, and commitment (Dutton, Lilius, & Kanov, 2007; Frost et al., 
2000; Lilius et al., 2008) fostering coworker bonding and support towards others in need (Simpson, 
Cunha, & Rego, 2014) and facilitating post-trauma healing (Dutton, Frost, Worline, Lilius, & Kanov, 
2002; Lilius, Worline, Dutton, Kanov, & Maitlis, 2011; Powley & Cameron, 2006). Recognition of 
these organizational benefits has bolstered growing interest in organizational compassion (for 
overviews see Dutton, Workman, & Hardin, 2014; Lilius, Kanov, Dutton, Worline, & Maitlis, 2012; 
Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton, & Margolis, 2012; Simpson, Clegg, & Pitsis, 2014a). 
Despite these benefits, recent research has critiqued the POS literature on organizational 
compassion as overlooking the power dynamics and potential for negative outcomes inherent in any 
relational process (Simpson, Clegg, & Cunha, 2013; Simpson, Clegg, & Freeder, 2013; Simpson, 
Clegg, & Pitsis, 2014b). The enthusiastic mainstream discourse on the organizational benefits of 
compassion has glossed over an extensive body of work in philosophy, literature, and academic 
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research indicating the limits of compassion (Simpson, Clegg, Lopez, et al., 2014). As an example, 
Aristotle (350 BCE/1992) defined virtue as the golden mean between the vices of deficiency and 
excess (Bagozzi, 2003). Hence, if compassion is the mean then its deficiency would be the vice of 
callousness, and its excess the vices of pity or “bleeding heart” sentimentality (Hinman, 2013, p. 268). 
Failure to recognize and account for the negative aspects of compassion indicates a lack of reflexivity 
and critical reasoning, so crucial for good academic scholarship and virtuous organizational practice. 
The mainstream discourse has additionally overlooked insights on compassion from other cultural 
traditions. Generally, western theories and concepts of management dominate curriculums, textbooks 
and journal publications (Check-Teck, 2010; Muniapan, 2008). POS has been specifically critiqued as 
promoting emotions that are “positive” within the western context but “negative” in other cultural 
settings (Fineman, 2006). Globalization has lead to further questioning of the universality of 
management theories and recognition that corporate and regional cultures are not homogeneous in 
their logics and epistemologies (Maruyama, 1994). Scholars have responded by exploring historical 
management concepts from texts rooted in regional cultural heritages (Check-Teck, 2010; Gopinath, 
1998; Kumar & Rao, 1996). While these ancient texts proscribe practices for effectively governing a 
kingdom state, they are increasingly being reinterpreted within the context of corporate management 
(Alexander & Buckingham, 2011; Chamola, 2007; Garde, 2006; Muniapan, 2008).  
Aware of these critiques, in October 2012 I enthusiastically accepted an invitation to visit the 
Kingdom of Bhutan, as an opportunity to explore a state where compassion is propounded a guiding 
principle of public administration. Bhutan is one of the world’s only two states where Buddhism is the 
official religion. Hence, considering that Buddhism holds compassion as one of its primary ethics, 
Bhutan provides an ideal setting for investigating the ideal of compassionate governance. The 
Constitution of The Kingdom of Bhutan (2008, p. 20)  directs: “The State shall strive to create 
conditions that will enable the true and sustainable development of a good and compassionate society 
rooted in Buddhist ethos and universal human values”.  
The paper is structured as follows: Initially I describe the cultural context of Bhutan as a State 
that has traditionally been administrated on the principle of compassion. The specific focus of my 
analysis narrows down to a description of semiotic images of compassion as traditionally signified 
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within the Dzong (state-religious fortress-monasteries). Analysis reveals the importance of 
recognizing the limits of compassion and cultivating it in conjunction with virtues of wisdom and 
power. The implications of this analysis for further academic research and the challenges of realizing 
it in organizational practice are also discussed.  
Compassion and Gross National Happiness 
Over the past half a century, Bhutan has attempted to amalgamate modernity and tradition 
through a government emphasis on modernization efforts in education, health, and economic 
development, along with synchronic efforts in ecological and cultural preservation. In contrast to 
highlighting Gross Domestic Product as a measure of national performance, in 1972 the King of 
Bhutan declared an official policy objective of increasing the nation’s Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) by building an economy that serves, rather than supersedes, the country’s spiritual values 
(Bates, 2009). Scholars associate Bhutan’s focus on GNH as a direct expression of the Buddhist 
principle of compassion (McDonald, 2003). Tashi (2011, p. 19) writes “GNH, besides fostering a 
compassionate point of view or feeling for others, is also about compassionate engaged action”. 
During my 14-day visit to Bhutan, I engaged in discussions on compassionate governance with 
administrators, employees, and monks. I also kept a journal and studied any literature I could access. 
However, it was my eyes (and camera), resting upon the semiotic imagery adorning the 12 Dzongs I 
visited that provided the most valuable insight. The Dzong are state-religious fortress-monasteries, 
which continue to function as district administrative and cultural-religious centres in each district of 
Bhutan. Dujardin (2000, p. 153) explains the role the prominent role the Dzong continues to play 
within Bhutanese society, not just as “relatively dead” relicts of a heroic feudal past as in the European 
castle, but as living monuments of the present, where they continue to fulfil the same political-
administrative and religious functions for which they were designed and constructed. Dujardin (2000, 
pp. 151-152) further argues that in addition to serving primary political and religious functions, “the 
monastery-fortress may well be approached as a ‘propelling’ monument, a culture magnet and vehicle 
of cultural transfer in contemporary Bhutan”.  
A defining feature of the Dzong, and Bhutanese architecture generally, is the ornamentation of 
wooden surfaces such as windows, doors and beams with floral, animal, and religious motifs in 
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traditional colours and patterns. Observation of this semiotic imagery of compassion adorning most 
monasteries and Dzongs provided insight into the Bhutanese perspective of administrative 
compassion. In most instances Chenrezi “Bodhisattva of Compassion”, was not represented alone, but 
as triad of personalities that additionally included Jampelyang “Bodhisattva of Wisdom” and Chana 
Dorjee “Bodhisattva of Power”. Once this observation was noted early on in my visit, it served as the 
basis for further discussions through the remainder of my trip. I quickly learned that according to 
Bhutanese tradition neither Compassion, Wisdom nor Power can be complete or beneficial in their 
effects without the other two (Ura, 2004). Compassion without Wisdom is merely sentimentalism. 
Compassion without Power cannot lead to active responding to elevate the suffering of others. 
Therefore, Compassion, Wisdom, and Power need to be cultivated together in order to benefit oneself 
and society. Artistically, the three Bodhisattvas were arranged in different configurations. While some 
illustrations had Compassion as the central figure, in other depictions it was Wisdom, flanked by 
Compassion and Power, or Power flanked by Wisdom and Compassion (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The idea conveyed with Wisdom as the central figure is that Wisdom without Compassion leads 
to arrogance. Similarly, Wisdom without Power will not lead to any practical application of the 
learning. Wisdom must be cultivated with Compassion and Power to be of benefit to oneself or others. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
A third configuration had Power as the central figure flanked by Wisdom and Compassion. The 
idea illustrated here is that Power without Compassion can be self-serving and exploitative. Similarly, 
Power without Wisdom will be destructive. In summary, Compassion, Wisdom, and Power should not 
be cultivated in isolation of each other.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Another image that was commonly depicted was that of a tiger (or a bull in some instances), with 
a chain attached to a collar around its neck that is being led by a man. Here the symbolism of the tiger 
(or bull) represents power, the chain represents wisdom, and the man, compassion. To achieve 
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wellbeing and prosperity in society, power must be excised with wisdom, in accordance with the ideal 
of compassion.  
Insert Figure 4 about here 
The Bhutanese Buddhist view, [also represented in Tibetan Buddhist art as the deities 
Avalokeshvara compassion, Manjushri wisdom and Vajrapani power (Beer, 1999)], demonstrates 
positive awareness of the limits of compassion by emphasizing that without wisdom and power, 
practices of compassion will have negative outcomes or be impossible to enact.   
Discussion 
The observations described above indicate that the State of Bhutan, with its rich Buddhist 
heritage, views compassion as a guiding principle of its public administration yet it also acknowledges 
the limits of compassion along with the necessity of augmenting it with wisdom and power. 
Aristotelian thought similarly suggests that the limitations of specific virtues can be counteracted 
through the cultivation of other complimentary virtues, wherein the value of each virtue in the cluster 
compensates for the other virtue’s weaknesses. The insights derived from Bhutan suggest that we can 
narrow down the virtues of wisdom and power as compensating for the limitations of compassion. 
Correspondingly, compassion compensates for the weaknesses of wisdom and power. In contrast, 
acknowledgement of the limits of compassion is mostly absent in the organizational compassion 
literature (Dutton & Workman, 2011; Rynes et al., 2012). In the discussion that follows, rather than 
emphasizing the interdependencies of each of these three virtues, I will focus on the limitations of 
compassion and how without wisdom and power, organisations cannot adequately respond to 
suffering.  
Wisdom and Compassion 
Compassion as antithetical to wise organizational practices 
Philosophers from Plato (1992), to Spinoza (1996), to Kant (1996) and Nietzsche (1966, 1997, 
1998, 2002) have dismissed compassion as antithetical to wisdom, viewing it as emotional and 
irrational and therefore as a questionable guide for ethical behaviour. These philosophers further argue 
that compassion discourages individual efforts for wellbeing; undermines their personal agency, 
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dignity, and self-worth; and overemphasizes the importance of material possessions. Kant (1996) and 
Nietzsche (1999) add that compassion expands suffering by contagion, from one to two or more.  
Within the domain of administrative practice, a similar critique was advanced by Thompson 
(1975), who argued that compassionate administration is unfair and unjust and is an expression of 
favouritism and partisanship rather than the due process that comes from following organizational 
policies. Support for this view can be found in Klein, Highberger, and Shaw’s (1995) research 
indicating that compassion leads to decisions that conflict with justice. In summary, compassion alone 
appears insufficient in assuring positive outcomes for givers and receivers in organizational relations. 
Unless augmented by wise judgment, compassion can generate sentimentality and unfairness.  
Defending compassion – by implicitly incorporating wisdom 
In contrast to the centuries of criticism that compassion is a poor guide for ethical action due to 
its perceived irrationality, the scholars who will be discussed next describe compassion as involving 
reasoning processes. While these scholars see this reasoning as part of the process of compassion, the 
position I argue is that reasoning represents a separate virtue – wisdom. I suggest that the scholars 
discussed below have implicitly acknowledged that wisdom must be cultivated along with compassion 
in order for compassion to be beneficial.  
Drawing from Aristotle (2006), Nussbaum (2003) defends compassion against arguments 
denouncing it as sentimental and unreasonable by arguing that the “structure of compassion” (p. 304) 
involves several “cognitive elements” (p. 321) or “judgments”. These concern: (1) size or the 
seriousness of the suffering another experiences; (2) nondesert where the suffering was not brought 
upon the individual by any personal fault; (3) the judgment of similar possibilities wherein the 
predicament of the suffering person is identified as a condition that could be one’s own, and (4) 
eudemonic judgment wherein the suffering person is an important part of one’s own life goals and 
objectives (Nussbaum, 2013).  
Nussbaum’s (2003) judgments are limited to the perspective of the “giver” of compassion. In 
contrast within the context of management and organisations Dutton et al. (2014) develop the idea of 
appraisals as involving mutual sensemaking wherein “both the sufferer and the focal actor seek to 
comprehend the situation and their roles in relation to it and each other” (p. 285). For the giver, 
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sensemaking can involve both perspective-taking and appraising, two processes, which have a 
moderating, effect upon each other. It can additionally comprise evaluating the past and future 
consequences of compassion responding initiatives. For the receiver it can include developing 
attributions regarding the giver’s motives for providing support. A similar idea is presented by 
Simpson et al. (2014b, p. 475) who describe a process of mutual assessments of members’ compassion 
worthiness as legitimate receiver(s) and giver(s) as inherent in compassion relations. The assessments 
Simpson et al. describe involve four characteristics each for both the receiver and the giver in 
compassion relations.  
The above discussions implicitly incorporate wisdom into analyses of compassion relations. I 
argue that it would be much more honest and beneficial for organizational theory to explicitly 
recognize the limitations of compassion and to emphasise the importance of compensating for these 
limitations through the cultivation of the Aristotelian notion of phronetic wisdom (Antonacopoulou, 
2010; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Flyvbjerg, Landman, & Schram, 2012). Phronesis is practical wisdom or 
experienced ethical discernment, applied as good actions or praxis as a way of living. Phronesis is 
contrasted with techne or technical or instrumental knowledge, applied in poiesis or production. In the 
wake of corporate scandals and the financial crisis there have been calls for a greater emphasis on 
phronesis in management learning, decision-making and leadership, with a lesser emphasis on techne 
(Clegg, Jarvis, & Pitsis, 2013; Jarvis & Amann, 2011; Rego, Cunha, & Clegg, 2012). The linking of 
phonesis to praxis or action illustrates the relationship between wisdom and power (the power to make 
decisions and get things done). Within the context of compassion relations power is expressed in the 
giving or refusing to give support, as well as the power to receive or refuse to accept support offered.  
The relationship between wisdom or truth and power has been discussed at length by social 
scientists concerned with domination and control over agents both through decisions made and not 
made (described as the first and second dimensions of power), as well as through determining other 
people’s thoughts, desires and perceived needs (the third dimension) (Lukes, 1974). Truth and power 
thereby exist in a recursive relationship of mutual constitution and domination (Foucault, 1984). As a 
method for reflecting upon and exposing domination by the assumptions of accepted truth-power 
claims, phronesis is invaluable tool of freedom for the researcher and the management practitioner 
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(Clegg, Flyvbjerg, & Haugaard, 2014). Next we will further analyse of compassion as it relates to 
power. Our analysis involves consideration of both a single dimensional or agency view of power as it 
relates to compassion – as well as a multidimensional relational view of power-compassion relations 
(Clegg, 1989).  
Power and Compassion  
Compassion dependent on personal power 
Power has been described by Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips (2006, pp. 2, 3) as “the central 
concept in the social sciences” and “the core of organizational achievement”. While frequently 
theorised merely as a title or position, power is much more, encompassing all social relations that 
mould the unfolding or inhibition of capabilities, choices, and change (Knights & Roberts, 1982), 
including compassion relations (Simpson, Clegg, & Freeder, 2013; Simpson, Clegg, Lopez, et al., 
2014; Simpson, Clegg, & Pitsis, 2014a, 2014b). Power has many dimensions and levels of analysis 
(Clegg, 1989; Haugaard, 2012). At the individual level, power can be equated with personal strength 
and courage. Compassion is dependent upon power to be applied in action. Drawing on Nietzsche’s 
(1968) notion of a will to power, the philosopher Tillich (1952, p. 27) explains that “courage is the 
power of life to affirm itself” in the face of life’s many ambiguities, “while the negation of life 
because of its negativity is an expression of cowardice”. For Aristotle (2006), courage is the first 
amongst virtues, giving possibility to the expression of other virtues such as compassion. The famous 
bystander effect, which says that the likelihood of an individual helping a person in an emergency 
decreases as the number of bystanders increases (Darley & Latane, 1968), reveals that compassionate 
actions require courage to be different by breaking out from the norms of an informal group. 
Being compassionate takes courage because strong identification with another’s suffering can 
generate a sense of sentimental hopelessness and overwhelmed, described as moral distress (Halifax, 
2011). A symptom of such overwhelm is compassion fatigue, emotional and physical exhaustion 
which is a typical experience for people in organizations who perform emotional labour such as those 
in the caring professions (Hochschild, 1983). It is also found in those who play the role of the 
workplace toxic handler – taking on other’s emotional distress on account of compassionless 
organizational practices (Frost, 2003).  
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Spinoza (1996) saw this type of “unmanly compassion” (p. 68) as springing from “bondage” or 
“man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the effects” (p. 113). Despite pointing out similar 
concerns, Nietzsche (1968, pp. 198-199) also distinguished a higher compassion, the “more manly 
brother of compassion” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 79), a compassion of strength. For Nietzsche (2002, p. 
67) such compassion was expressed at an emotional distance. According to Cartwright (1984), 
distance saves the recipient of compassion from the humiliation of knowing that they are the object of 
someone’s charity, thereby preserving their dignity by protecting them from developing a sense of 
dependency. Distance also allows the giver anonymity eliminating the weakness of bragging and 
minimizing sentimental attachments (Pullen & Simpson, 2009). Swanton (2011) argues that Nietzsche 
advocates a mature generosity that contrasts with the vices of unhealthy compassion rooted in 
selfishness and self-sacrificing charity. A related idea here is for a person to have the courage to 
withdraw compassionate support when they know it is unsustainable, or has become overly emotional 
and might lead to further distress for all involved (Lilius et al., 2011). Compassion takes courage–to 
respond, withdraw and receive or refuse compassionate support, which will be considered next.  
Compassion as powerlessness  
While compassion can be viewed dependent on personal power and courage, paradoxically, it can 
also be perceived as a sign of weakness. Research also indicates that peer groups or subordinates 
sometimes view compassionate behaviour on the part of their friend or manager as indicating 
powerlessness, weakness and sentimentality (Georges, 2011; Martino, 2000). Compassion may lead to 
avoiding issues such as personal struggles or failing in their work position rather than helping people 
return to strong performance or to replacing them if required.  
The famous Milgram obedience experiments revealed that feelings of compassion could create a 
sense of obligation and obedience to an authority figure – and drive subordinates to inflict lethal 
shocks upon others rather than disobey the orders of the researcher. Milgram (1975, p. 151) observed, 
“It is a curious thing that a measure of compassion on the part of the subject, an unwillingness to 
‘hurt’ the experimenter’s feelings, are part of the binding forces inhibiting disobedience”. Overall 
these negative considerations all relate to the giver. However, compassion can also be a negative 
experience for the person who receives compassion.  
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Organizational compassion as domination power 
The relationship between compassion and power has thus far been mainly analysed from the 
perspective of the giver, leaving the receiver’s perspective yet to be considered. For the receiver, 
personal power or courage might be exercised in maintaining dignity as a recipient of compassionate 
support. Compassion can be experienced as patronizing and belittling as if the giver is imposing to 
highlight a receiver’s vulnerabilities (Clark, 1987, 1997). Or it can feel as if it is being be offered with 
the aim of engendering the receiver’s sense of obligation and indebtedness, an interest in an enhanced 
public image, or for the collection of public funds (Richter & Norman, 2010). In her research, Clark 
(1997, p. 190) found that in such instances receivers sometimes assert their dignity with “strength and 
courage” by refusing the support, or accepting it on their own terms and conditions.  
Compassionate support can further create a sense of dependency, indebtedness, and even 
emotional enslavement of the receiver towards the provider of help (Stirrat & Henkel, 1997; Szasz, 
1998). The exceptionalism that characterizes compassion, where an individual or group is singled out 
for special care and attention, can also generate feelings of envy and jealousy in the receiver’s peer 
group (Crisp, 2003; Frost et al., 2006). It can further generate a diminished sense of self-confidence, 
courage, self-trust, and healthy pride, along with feelings of personal shame and resentment towards 
the giver (Lupton, 2011). Research into the voluntourism industry, where people from first world 
countries travel to volunteer in developing countries, perhaps in an orphanage in Africa or Cambodia, 
have found that the attachments formed between the volunteers and the children, precipitate a sense of 
reabandonment in the children once the volunteer leaves, compounding the negative impacts of 
institutionalized care (Richter & Norman, 2010). Dependency upon others for compassionate support 
can also lead to the development of a victim mentality, with a diminished sense of personal agency 
and responsibility for one’s personal wellbeing and happiness (Olasky, 1995). Compassion can also be 
experienced as patronizing and as infringing upon a receiver’s personal freedom and thereby as a 
cause for moral rage (Acorn, 2004). The latter can eventuate when a giver, who pities a suffering 
person and believes they know better than them as to where their best interests lie, imposes 
“compassion” upon an unwilling recipient. 
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An example of imposing “compassionate” support as a government or organizational policy was 
the “stolen generation” of Aboriginal Australian children who, between 1909 and 1969, were taken 
from their mothers at birth and adopted out to parents considered more qualified to raise them 
(Lecouteur & Augoustinos, 2001). Another example is the Magdalene asylums that operated as 
“shelters” for girls considered a cause of social degradation in Irish society (Mik-Meyer & Villadsen, 
2013; Simpson, Clegg, Lopez, et al., 2014). In retrospect, both of these cases, apparently initiated with 
compassionate intentions, have been described as examples of “total institutions” (Clegg et al., 2006, 
p. 143). These considerations all highlight the fact that organizational compassion is inseparable from 
considerations of power and therefore must be guided by phronesis.  
Conclusion 
My argument suggests that cultivating organizational compassion that actually benefits all parties 
concerned is dependent upon acknowledging the limitations of compassion. Further it requires 
augmenting the cultivation of compassion with phronesis that includes an understanding of the 
workings of power in compassion relations as well as the cultivation of personal courage and strength. 
Achieving a balance between compassion, wisdom and power is easier said than done, however, and is 
therefore an excellent topic for further research. Future research might also investigate if there are 
virtues that are additionally important as compliments to organizational compassion. 
Bhutan could be a starting point for further research on how the values projected in the Dzong are 
assimilated, cultivated, and materialized as the lived experience of the Bhutanese people. The 
country’s GNH policy is one attempt at governance by a synergistic balance of compassion, wisdom 
and power, for the benefit of all. Yet, this attempt is also ridden with flaws stemming from abuse of 
domination power in the name of compassion. Bhutan is advertised in popular culture, the media, 
travel brochures, and academics with nostalgic imagery of an isolated, high, ancient, authentic, and 
uncorrupted Buddhist kingdom – the last Shangri-La, or a rediscovered Eden. Critics, however, hold 
that the dominant utopian narrative is highly mythologized (Schroeder, 2011) and ignores the ongoing 
tension between Bhutan’s aspiration to maintain its traditions while also pursuing development 
towards modernity (Brunet, Bauer, De Lacy, & Tshering, 2001). Mishra (2013) argues that Bhutan’s 
policy of GNH has guided international attention away from the coercive disenfranchisement of 
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Bhutan’s 100,000 Hindu-Nepalese minority, which comprise about one sixth of the population. 
Although they have lived in Bhutan for several generations, in the 1980s all were declared illegal 
immigrants and forced to become refugees outside the country’s borders (Duncan, 2013). As a 
population, they did not fit with Bhutan’s effort to paternalistically (or maternalistically) construct and 
maintain a coherent national identity through a “one nation, one people” policy, emphasizing the 
preservation and practice of traditional Druka social and cultural norms of dress, architecture, and 
etiquette (Mishra, 2013). The interests of national happiness are thereby used to justify illiberal 
practices of compulsory dress codes, the proscription of traditional architectural motifs for all new 
constructions, and not least, the exile of a minority population (Bok, 2010; Potts, 2011). Critics 
additionally argue that measures of GNH are not nearly as reliable as Gross Domestic Product as a 
basis for government policy or international compassion for they rely upon subjective judgments of 
wellbeing, which may be arbitrarily defined by government in a manner that best serves its own 
interests (McCloskey, 2012).  
Just as perceptions of Bhutan reflect highly romanticized narratives that seek to hide the 
messiness and contradictions behind its experiment with Buddhist democracy, so the representation of 
organizational compassion within dominant organizational discourse has been active in promoting a 
mythicized image of the benefits that result from organizational compassion while mostly failing to 
consider its limitations and negative aspects. Arguing that compassion is valuable because it provides 
organizational benefits presents compassion as techne, an instrumental technique of production or 
poiesis. Organizational compassion is valuable not just as a means to an end but as an in itself. To be 
applied as virtuous praxis, however, it must be guided by phronesis. In this paper I have sought to 
contribute to the cultivation of phronesis in organisational theory by pointing out the limitations of 
organizational compassion, while also offering hope for how those limitations can be addressed with 
an emphasis on additionally cultivating the complimentary virtues of personal strength and courage, as 
well as phronetic wisdom that includes an awareness of the workings of power.  
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Figure 1: The Bodhisattva of Compassion (centre) (flanked by the Bodhisattva of Wisdom [left], and the 
Bodhisattva of Power [right]) 
 
 
Figure 2: The Bodhisattva of Wisdom (centre) (flanked by the Bodhisattva of Compassion [left] and the 
Bodhisattva of Power [right]) 
 
Figure 3: The Bodhisattva of Power (centre) (flanked by the Bodhisattva of Wisdom [left], and the 
Bodhisattva of Compassion [right]) 
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